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ABSTRACT
International Threats and United States Congressional Behavior from 1981 – 2013
by
Elizabeth Randall, Master of Science
Utah State University, 2021

Major Professor: Dr. Anna Pechenkina
Department: Political Science
This paper asks: how does the presence of a unifying foreign threat affect party
cohesion and bipartisanship in the United States House of Representatives?
Understanding congressional response to such events is crucial in interpreting U.S.
foreign policy decisions and forecasting future responses to rising foreign threats. Using a
unique dataset containing roll-call voting records, individual characteristics of legislators,
and information about bill content, I created an ideology score for each member of the
House based on foreign policy votes only (Foreign Policy NOMINATE). Using these
scores, I analyze the distance between members’ original NOMINATE scores and the
Foreign Policy Nominate scores, as well as party-level cohesion and inter-party
polarization from 1918 – 2013.
I find that both parties moderate their positions on foreign policy (relative to all
other issues) during a period of foreign threat; the substantive effect, however, is modest.
I also find that party cohesion on foreign policy is lower than on other issues, and that
party cohesion and polarization do not appear to be influenced by the presence of a
foreign threat.

60 pages
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT
International Threats and United States Congressional Behavior from 1981 – 2013
Elizabeth Randall
This paper explores the relationship between a foreign threat and the behavior of
members of Congress. Understanding how members of Congress respond to potentially
threatening international situations can provide important insight into foreign policy and
future responses to new threats. I use information about how legislators vote, their
ideology and party, and the topic of legislation to measure how liberal or conservative
members of Congress are on foreign policy legislation. This allows me to analyze both
how members of Congress behave inside their parties and how they interact with the
other party, or in other words, intraparty cohesion and interparty polarization.
I find that the parties moderate their positions on foreign policy (relative to all
other issues) when a foreign threat is present and the majority in Congress will approach
foreign policy from a more moderate angle than the minority party at times of foreign
threat; these effects, however, are substantively modest. I also find that party members
agree amongst themselves less on foreign policy than on other issues. My results indicate
that internal party behavior and interactions between parties are not strongly affected by
the presence of a foreign threat.
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INTRODUCTION

Since 1964, party cohesion increased, while bipartisanship significantly declined
— these phenomena resulted from southern Democrats switching to the Republican party
after the Civil Rights Act passed under President Johnson (Aldrich & Rohde, 2000). Even
after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, which should have increased interparty
agreement, we see that bipartisanship largely maintained its downward trend. Yet, it is
often said that American voters are not concerned with foreign policy issues (Hyrnowski,
2020), which implies that foreign policy is possibly one issue area where these trends of
heightened party cohesion and reduced bipartisanship may not manifest to the same
extent. After all, nothing has quite as unifying an affect as a looming threat from a
foreign enemy.
This paper asks: how does the presence of a unifying foreign threat affect party
cohesion and bipartisanship in the United States House of Representatives?
Understanding how national security hazards may affect congressional behavior is
essential for interpreting and forecasting the nation’s response to such events. The rise of
China precipitates fears of another potential grand power rivalry in the near future, as
well as brings up a practical question about the U.S. domestic politics — shall we
observe more bipartisanship if China is viewed as a rival threatening U.S. hegemony?
Will there be a gap in bipartisanship between domestic and foreign policy? Examining
the past history of congressional response to the USSR and then 9/11 allows us to better
understand and anticipate changes in congressional member behavior surrounding future
foreign threats.
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To answer this question, I first build the argument that members of the House are
careful about their voting because they do not always know which votes will become
controversial. Intraparty cohesion, the degree to which party members behave alike on a
variety of issues (e.g., Grumm 1964; Krehbiel, 2000) has been rising since the 1970s
when southern Democrats realigned themselves with Republicans (e.g., Aldrich &
Rohde, 2000; Cox & McCubbins, 1991). A number of factors predict (to varying degrees)
divergence from party positions, including expertise, regional interests, and majority
party status; the international environment has, however, been overlooked by the extant
literature as a possible determinant of intraparty cohesion.
In contrast, interparty cooperation, known as bipartisanship, has declined since
the 1970s when more members of Congress began to strongly identify with their party
and have subsequently moved closer to their party extremes (e.g., Harbridge, Malhotra, &
Harrison, 2014; Poole & Rosenthal, 1984). The decline in bipartisanship has been almost
entirely uninterrupted and has persisted across domestic and foreign policy issues (e.g.,
Flynn, 2014; McCormick &Wittkopf, 1990).
Congress’s involvement in foreign policy has changed throughout American
history, but legislators generally defer to the president on foreign policy issues when the
U.S. is facing a national security threat (e.g., Lindsay, 1992; Trubowitz & Mellow, 2011).
Although much foreign policy literature has underscored that voters know or care little
about international politics, members of the House are careful about how they vote
because they never know ex ante which votes will become controversial in their next
election cycle (e.g., Aldrich, et al. 2006; Baum & Potter, 2008). One therefore should
expect votes on foreign policy to be given just as much (or potentially more)

3
consideration by the members as on other issue areas. No extant work systematically
examines how the international environment shapes inter-party polarization in the US
House.
Relying on the conclusions from social psychology, I argue that social identity
awareness in the face of a threat causes legislators to prioritize their identity as
Americans over their party identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). When faced with an outside
enemy, legislators can put their party affiliation on the backburner to prioritize their
national identity and present the challenger with a unified American front rather than a
fractured partisan one. My hypothesis anticipates that during the times of foreign threat
presence, bipartisanship rises. This implies that a decline in both the intraparty cohesion
(because members will cross the isle to compromise with the other party) and inter-party
polarization (because the gap in average party voting positions should shrink due to
compromise on foreign policy issues).
To test this expectation, I use two sets of data. First, the NOMINATE data set by
Lewis et al. (2021) provides me with measures of overall party cohesion in 1981–2013
(across all members for each party in each of 16 congresses of this period). This 32-year
time period provides two windows of perceived foreign threat from different sources: the
USSR in 1981–1988 and from Al Qaeda in 2001–2005. I also use the rollcall data on the
House of Representatives in 1981–2013 to create a new Foreign Policy NOMINATE
score for each member of the House for each congress by using votes on foreign policy
legislation. Using those scores, I analyze the distance between members’ original
NOMINATE scores and Foreign Policy NOMINATE scores, as well as party-level
cohesion and inter-party polarization in 1981–2013.
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I find that the presence of a unifying threat decreases the distance between
NOMINATE scores and Foreign Policy NOMINATE scores for all members of the
House. Additionally, majority party members’ distance between foreign policy votes and
all other issue votes widens, suggesting that majority parties moderate their positions on
foreign policy during a period of perceived threat. There is no significant trend in
divergence between foreign policy ideology scores and ideology scores for all other
issues over time. I find that party cohesion on foreign policy is lower than on other issues
(especially for Democrats); however, party cohesion does not appear to be influenced by
the presence of a foreign threat.
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ARGUMENT

Trends in Congressional Behavior since 1964: Party Cohesion Rises and Bipartisanship
Declines
This section overviews two big trends in American politics due to southern
Democrats switching to the Republican party in the post-Civil Rights Act decades: party
cohesion rose (intraparty behavior), and bipartisanship declined (interparty behavior) in
the U.S. Congress.

What is party cohesion?
Political parties shape behavior and influence Congressional agendas, as well as
create a mechanism through which constituents can view politicians as representing or
not representing their views with little effort towards understanding the issues (Grumm,
1964). Representatives group themselves within the House of Representatives in a variety
of ways, which are influenced by internal expectations and norms. Through voluntary
groupings, representatives may diverge from the party line in certain issue areas. Party
cohesion is the degree to which members of a party vote together as compared to
members of the opposition party (Grumm 1964; Norpoth, 1976; Volden & Bergman,
2006). Party affiliation and party cohesion is “rooted in shared policy attitudes;” it allows
members of the group to rely on certain “experts” to signal how they should support a bill
in order to reduce the information cost of casting informed votes on a piece of legislation
(Norpoth, 1976; Krehbiel, 2000). While party line voting is by no means a given, it is
often viewed as the default position for busy legislators.
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Congressional procedure and norms have been shaped overtime, influenced both
by consensus and disagreement about the rules of the House (Bach, 1990, 49). There is
some disagreement about which norms are the most important – whether majority
numbers or agenda setting power have more influence over legislative outcomes (Bianco
& Sened, 2005). Party organization allows “kindred legislative spirits” to solve the
legislative problems they confront through engaging in the process under a more
coordinated uniform grouping (Shepsle & Weingast, 1994, 153). Some scholars argue
that the majority party’s agenda setting power gives them power over legislative
outcomes because party members want to opt into the benefits provided by majority party
leadership to ensure their electorate is satisfied with their legislative success (Aldrich &
Rohde, 1998; Aldrich & Rohde 2000). Krehbiel’s assessment attributes majority party
power to the number of votes available to advance the party’s legislative priorities (1999,
2000). Because these groupings are voluntary, studying group behavior can provide
important insight into the legislators’ incentives that result in which legislation is
successful and what gets voted on, including foreign policy bills.

The rise in party cohesion in the past decades
Scholars have categorized the majority of the twentieth century (Congresses until
the 1970s) as a period of relatively stable, albeit low, party unity (Cox & McCubbins,
1991; Clubb & Traugott, 1977). During the late 1960s and 1970s, southern Democrats
began to contend with black voters in much larger numbers than before, requiring
southern Democratic candidates to more closely align with northern democrats to win in
a liberalized Democratic party. While many districts traded their southern Democrat
representative for a Republican, other democrats were able to retain their seats in a newly
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liberal district, creating greater unity within the Democratic party (Aldrich & Rohde,
2000). This explains the significant increase in party cohesion in the 1980s —
Democratic cohesion in 1987 was higher than it had been since 1909 (Rohde, 1990).

Determinants of divergent voting

Expertise is a weak predictor of divergence on the final vote
One place in which members diverge from their groupings is voting differently in
committee votes and floor votes as compared to the larger group. Representatives are
more likely to vote differently than their party on bills that came through their committee
before coming to a floor vote. This is known as committee-floor divergence (Carson,
Finocchario, & Rohde, 2002, 5-6). Increased exposure to the issue and understanding of
the bill can lead members to vote in opposition to their party when they otherwise would
not. However, this effect is not present in final passage votes “because many members
will prefer passing a bill as a whole (even in a slightly altered form) to not passing one at
all” (Carson, Finocchario, & Rohde, 6).
Additionally, in final passage votes other members of the party without specific
knowledge of the subject matter in the bill will look to the committee members they trust
for cues about whether to support such a bill, which would offset the divergence observed
in other vote types (Norpoth, 1976).

Regional interests predict divergence
Some divergence in voting patterns has also been attributed to distributive
policies in which the benefits are targeted towards a specific geographic area, but the
costs are distributed across the whole (Collie, 867). In this case, an individual legislator
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may diverge from the party position to protect or better serve the interests of their
constituency. This divergence has affected overall party cohesion across Congresses.
Indeed, decreasing party cohesion has been attributed to “increasing defections by a
minority regional grouping within each party from the positions taken by the majority
segment of the party” (Sinclair, 1977, 121).
These groupings vary in size and membership depending on the subject matter in
a bill. During the Cold War, non-southern Democrats were the most internationalist while
their southern party members were the most isolationist (Norpoth, 1976). In the same
period southern Democrats and Republicans sometimes formed a “conservative
coalition” on civil rights legislation showing that regional opposition to integration could
overshadow party loyalty in some cases (Norpoth, 1976, 1161).

Majority status predicts divergence
In addition to regional defection, majority party status can increase cohesion within a
party (Sinclair, 1977, 155). Majority party leadership can create “a structuring coalition,
stacking the deck in its own favor — both on the floor and in committee — to create a
kind of legislative cartel that dominates the legislative agenda” (Cox & McCubbins,
1993, 270). This structure can be used to incentivize members to vote with the party or
punish members who diverge from the party line (Aldrich & Rohde, 1998). Although
members of the majority party from vulnerable districts may be more likely to vote
against the party regardless of benefits derived from adhering to the party’s agenda on a
given bill (Flinn, 1964), they may feel more pressure to support party cohesion when the
party enjoys majority status and the preferences of the opposing party are further from the
preferences of the majority party (Volden & Bergman, 2006).
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Bipartisanship

What is Bipartisanship?
Another way to measure behavior in Congress is to look at bipartisanship,
commonly defined as “the extent to which majorities or near majorities of both parties in
Congress vote together” (Trubowitz & Mellow, 2011, 181). It is the mechanism by which
Congress and the President can attain mutual legislative success (McCormick &Wittkopf,
1990). Bipartisanship is discussed frequently in the public sphere, and a majority of
Americans believe bipartisan legislation should be the goal of Congress — approval or
disapproval of Congress often hinges on the public’s perception of cooperation between
the parties (Harbridge, Malhotra, & Harrison, 2014). In the public debate it has
commonly been insinuated that bipartisanship is preferable to partisanship because it is
less political and more devoted to principle than to electoral success. Presidents often
make appeals for the need for more bipartisanship in Congress and, as suggested
previously, voters evaluate Congress based on their perceived bipartisan cooperation.
Consistent with this common understanding of the role of bipartisanship in
American politics as preferable by voters, some scholars identify bipartisanship as an
electoral strategy used by some to widen a legislator’s appeal to different types of voters
(Trubowitz & Mellow, 2005). In contrast, other scholars have found that in reality, voters
prefer their own partisan legislative priorities rather than bipartisan legislation that could
indicate a loss for their party (Harbridge, Malhotra, & Harrison, 2014). Though voters in
very moderate districts may certainly prefer a candidate who supports a wider range of
policy, legislators from more ideologically secure districts can confidently pursue their
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party’s priorities. Understanding party cooperation in Congress is incredibly complex. It
has changed significantly over the course of American political history.

The decline in bipartisanship in the past decades
Inter-party cooperation in Congress is subject to many forces and has changed
significantly over the course of the past century. In the first decades of the twentieth
century, partisan conflict was relatively low. The New Deal provided an uptick in
disagreement between parties, but only had a temporary effect on bipartisanship trends
(Collie, 1988). Since the 1970s, bipartisanship has been declining as more members of
Congress identify more strongly with their political party (Harbridge & Malhotra, 2011).
As bipartisanship in Congress has been declining in recent decades, polarization
has become more deeply entrenched in American politics (Jeong & Quirk, 2019, 58-87).
Members of Congress represent their party extremes more often than moderate voters
(Poole & Rosenthal, 1984, 1061). For incumbents, greater levels of partisan loyalty in
Congress equal greater success in future primary elections, even though ideological
extremes are often punished in elections (Pyeatt, 2015). Party realignment over the last
50 years has produced ideologically uniform political parties — that is, Democrats are
now seen as synonymous with liberal and Republicans with conservative, leaving few
people to breach the gap between party and ideology (Schultz, 2017; Mason, 2014). This
has resulted in both parties shifting to the extremes of their ideology leaving few
representatives from either party to overlap in the middle of the political spectrum
(Schultz, 2017, 8). Another factor in decreasing bipartisanship is “Affective polarization”
or the dislike (and in some cases loathing) of one’s political opponents (Iyengar, Sood, &
Lelkes, 2012). These patterns of increased polarization and diminishing bipartisanship
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lead to higher levels of party cohesion as representatives reach across the aisle less and
less.
Bipartisanship in foreign policy: Do partisan politics stop at the water’s edge?
Scholars have suggested that the fall of the Soviet Union would precipitate a
permanent decline in congressional bipartisanship if significant efforts to renew
commitments to bipartisan government were not undertaken, and this decline has been
substantiated through analysis of roll-call voting (Winik, 1991, 115; McCormick
&Wittkopf, 1990; Meernik, 1993). Indeed, foreign policy bipartisanship did not increase
following the events of 9/11 as previous trends suggested it should, showing that the
decline in domestic bipartisanship was also affecting cross-partisan agreement about
foreign policy and national security (Trubowitz & Mellow, 2011, 164-165).
Bipartisanship in foreign policy related legislation has declined consistently due
to the increased importance of domestic policy considerations across the board (Jeong &
Quirk, 2019; Trubowitz & Mellow, 2011; Schultz, 2017; Flynn, 2014).

May External Threats Shape Congressional Behavior?

What powers does Congress have over U.S. foreign policy?
Congressional approaches to foreign policy have varied over time, ranging from
complete deference to the President to more involvement in recent years (Trubowitz &
Mellow, 2011, 166-168). The constitution grants both Congress and the President
significant foreign policy powers, so the deference Congress often shows to the executive
on matters of foreign policy is a political balance rather than institutional. When the
United States views itself as threatened the deferential relationship remains intact, but
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when the nation views itself as secure Congress pushes back and opposes the president’s
agenda much more often (Lindsay, 2003). The executive branch has traditionally
controlled much of the agenda-setting and decision power when it came to foreign policy
legislation. Despite the apparent disadvantage Congress faces when it comes to foreign
policy, it still plays an important role in defending their constituents’ immediate
preferences through the legislative process and through grandstanding (Lindsay, 1992,
608). I review each of these approaches in turn.

Legislative process
The more traditional way Congress can subvert executive branch control of
foreign policy is through legislative means. Blocking legislation or refusing to approve
actions abroad can frustrate a president’s foreign policy agenda but is unlikely to occur
when political conflict could damage a president’s stature against a foreign threat
(McCormick & Wittkopf, 1991; Lindsay, 2003). When a unifying threat is present,
opposition to the president’s foreign policy agenda can be viewed as unpatriotic and even
dangerous so Congress defers to the president (Lindsay, 2003).
Members of the House of Representatives are often involved in specific areas of
foreign policy tied to benefits for their district and are incentivized to participate more
fully in the creation and passage of foreign policy legislation by electoral factors and
special interest groups (Jacobs, Lawrence & Page, 2005). As domestic considerations like
the economy and regional rivalries have become more important to voters, members of
Congress have become more assertive of their legislative powers over foreign policy
(Trubowitz & Mellow, 2011). This trend has followed the warnings from scholars that

13
the end of the Cold War era would significantly diminish congressional bipartisanship on
foreign policy (McCormick & Wittkopf, 1991).

Shaping public opinion
Congress may oppose a president’s foreign policy agenda through public opinion.
Members of Congress have significant sway over their districts’ views of the executive,
creating an opportunity for members to raise the cost of a president’s agenda in the court
of public opinion, particularly when it comes to engagement in risky foreign conflicts
(Howell & Pevehouse, 2005). Grandstanding allows legislators to draw attention to an
overlooked foreign policy issue, build public popularity for policy supported by
Congress, or create enough pushback that a president reverses their course of action
(Lindsay, 1992).
Voters’ Interest in Foreign Policy
It is a widely held belief among political scientists that voters have little interest in
foreign policy and legislators can therefore ignore considerations about electoral
consequences for decisions they make in relation to that issue area. Scholarship from the
mid-twentieth century characterized public opinion on foreign policy as irrational,
uninformed, and inconsistent (Almond, 1950; Lippmann, 1955). During the Vietnam war,
the public maintained consistent opposition to the conflict and appeared, in survey data,
to be both moderate in foreign policy preferences and logical (Verba et al., 1967; Aldrich
et al, 2006)1. One area in which public opinion on foreign policy is demonstrably stable

1

In this instance, logical refers to the consistency of public opinion. The public is considered logical on
foreign policy in this literature because they exhibit consistent preferences that only undergo major shifts
when something significant in international politics occurs.
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and logical is decreasing support for a conflict as combat deaths increase (Mueller, 1973).
Aldrich et al. (2006) identify three criteria that must be met in order for public opinion on
foreign policy to affect how people vote: “ (a) the public must have coherent attitudes
about foreign policy, (b) the public must be able to access these attitudes when they vote,
and (c) the political parties must uphold distinct foreign policy platforms so that voters
can use their attitudes to distinguish between candidates” (496). Outside of academia,
policy makers often insist that public opinion on foreign policy cannot be trusted (Page &
Bouton, 2006).
Despite disagreement about the effect of public opinion, most scholars agree that
government consults public opinion on foreign policy creation less than on almost any
other issue. Verba et al. (1967) contends that even if government doesn’t take public
approval into account when making decisions, public disapproval over foreign policy can
influence national elections. The public’s influence on foreign policy changes as a
conflict continues so that “the public’s influence on foreign policy appears to be lowest
when it is informationally weakest (typically in early stages of conflicts) but somewhat
higher in longer conflicts as the information gap dissipates” (Baum & Potter, 2008, 48).
Despite this trend, the public struggles to access information independent of the mass
media. In the area of foreign policy, mass media is uniquely reliant on public officers and
policy makers, so opinions expressed by journalists are often “in harmony with official
foreign policy” (Page & Bouton, 2006, 27). The public’s difficulty in accessing
information has been aggravated by social media’s polarizing affects. As voter
polarization has increased, consensus on foreign policy among leaders and voters has
declined (Baum & Potter, 2019). Because Congress’ role in foreign policy creation is
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secondary to the president and subject to more immediate electoral accountability,
legislators may consult constituent opinions more frequently than executive branch
officials.

Understanding Audience Costs
During conflict, national executives are subject to audience costs related to
international engagement and foreign policy. Particularly in a democracy, these costs are
a significant factor in determining how much or how little a country will engage with an
enemy and are an important signal for opposing countries to consider (Fearon, 1994).
National executives fear punishment for unpopular or weak responses to international
conflict, and that fear conditions their behavior (Fearon, 1994). The cost of backing down
from a threat has only been empirically shown for executives, however, and may not
apply to Congress and legislators’ decision-making.

Electoral Constraints
Members of the House operate under the assumption that constituents closely
monitor their behavior. This belief acts as a constraint on roll call voting across all issues.
According to Richard Fenno, members of Congress always approach reelection with a
great deal of uncertainty even when their “reelection constituency” is large enough to
provide a sense of security (1978, 10-12). One of the sources of uncertainty is the
possibility that an unforeseen or new issue will arise during their campaign for reelection.
Because of this, legislators are cautious when casting potentially controversial votes
because they cannot know what will matter to voters in the next election cycle (Fenno,
1978). This means that even though the public’s opinions about foreign policy are not
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taken seriously by policy makers, legislators casting votes on bills relating to foreign
policy will behave as though that particular vote could become salient in a future
election. Even though the public generally knows very little about foreign policy,
legislators cannot be certain that their foreign policy voting record will not be called into
question in a tough election. Though legislators are certainly familiar with their
constituents’ preferences, they cannot predict how events will unfold, possibly making a
seemingly unimportant vote controversial or salient in the future.
Roll call voting can be particularly important in a future election because “roll
calls usually are taken on relatively major and relatively controversial issues… few major
decisions are made without benefit of at least one recorded vote” (Matthews & Stimson,
1975, 10). Legislators understand that their voting record can be used against them and
behave accordingly in order to win reelection (Matthews & Stimson, 1975). In addition to
the caution exercised generally, legislators are even more cautious when they know ahead
of time that a vote or issue will be controversial. Survey data shows the legislators
carefully weigh their options on controversial votes. They consider information from a
variety of sources to inform them about potential outcomes (Sullivan et al. 1993). When
surveyed about valuable cue-givers, both Democrats and Republicans ranked
constituency as a one of the most valuable sources of information for voting decisions in
the area of foreign policy (Sullivan et al. 1993). This shows that even though the public is
often uninformed or misinformed about foreign policy, legislators still consider how a
vote could be perceived in the future.
Members of the House are punished for voting in a way that is inconsistent with
constituent preferences, mainly because roll-call voting is the most visible and easily
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observed part of their job (Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart, 2001). This leads
legislators to fear that one bad vote can wipe out an otherwise favorable voting record
since they are operating under the assumption that they are closely monitored by
constituents (Matthews & Stimson, 1975). Electoral safety has been closely linked to
moderate voting patterns, indicating that voters punish members for voting with party
extremes, all else equal (Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan, 2002). Roll-call voting
patterns can be shaped by constituent preferences as long as a legislator believes they will
be punished, regardless of voters’ actual response to a particular issue (Erikson, 1990).
The more a legislator departs from the preferences of their constituents, the more likely
they are to see a decline in vote-share even if they have a “safe” seat or do not lose office
(Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan, 2002).
Even though voters may be relatively uninformed on matters of foreign policy,
legislators may estimate a greater potential cost when casting votes during a period of
international threat, causing them to be more cautious or more closely consider the
preferences of their constituents on those votes. If legislators are punished for being too
extreme, as stated above, this effect could increase when the U.S. is faced with a national
security threat from a foreign source. Members of the House may estimate the future
danger of foreign policy votes during that period as higher and moderate their behavior
accordingly.
According to social identity theory from social psychology, people often view
themselves and others primarily as group members, prioritizing their social identity over
their personal identity (Ellemers & Haslam, 2011). Social identity awareness in the face
of a threat causes legislators to prioritize their identity as Americans over their party
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identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). When faced with an outside enemy, legislators can put
their party affiliation on the backburner to prioritize their national identity and present the
challenger with a unified American front rather than a fractured partisan one. Patriotism
subsumes party loyalty, making legislators less likely to oppose executive priorities or
proposals from the other party.
Hypothesis: The presence of a unifying national security threat will increase
bipartisanship in the U.S. House of Representatives.
A rise in bipartisanship implies more inter-isle compromise, which is why in the
following sections, I focus on intraparty cohesion and inter-party polarization. Greater
bipartisanship should imply lower cohesion, since more members agree to compromise.
In addition, bipartisanship implies that polarization, i.e., the gap between each party’s
average member’s voting position, should decline as well. Therefore, my hypothesis
implies a reduction in both cohesion and polarization in times of threat on foreign policy
issues.
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RESEARCH DESIGN

Data Sources
To estimate the effect of the presence of a unifying threat on party cohesion and
bipartisanship on bills relating to foreign policy, an original dataset was assembled; it
includes data from the Political Institutions and Public Choice Roll-Call Database (PIPC)
compiled by Michael Crespin and David Rohde, 2 Legislative and District Data compiled
by Ella Foster-Molina,3 and Members’ Votes data from Voteview: Congressional RollCall Votes Database.4 Together these datasets provide information about roll call voting,
party cohesion, content of legislation, and individual characteristics of bill sponsors. This
information was used to produce individual NOMINATE scores for each member on the
issue of foreign policy.
The NOMINATE and FP NOINATE scores are aggregated in two ways. The first
dataset includes 7,059 observations at the individual member level covering the 97th-112th
congresses (16 congresses during 31 years of 1981–2013); the unit of analysis is
member-congress. The second dataset includes this information collapsed by congress
and by party to provide a congress level view of the variables for the same timeframe; the
unit of analysis is party-congress.

2

Crespin, Michael H. and David Rohde. (2019). Political Institutions and Public Choice Roll-Call
Database. Retrieved from https://ou.edu/carlalbertcenter/research/pipc-votes/
3
Foster-Molina, Ella. (2017). "Historical Congressional Legislation and District Demographics 19722014" https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/CI2EPI, Harvard Dataverse, V2,
UNF:6:yiLGWnus7Bn3psO0Tjzi2A== [fileUNF]
4
Lewis, Jeffrey B., Keith Poole, Howard Rosenthal, Adam Boche, Aaron Rudkin, and Luke Sonnet
(2021). Voteview: Congressional Roll-Call Votes Database. https://voteview.com/
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Operationalization

Dependent variables
The dependent variables compare the foreign policy NOMINATE scores
(hereafter, FPN scores) created for this paper with the DW-NOMINATE scores created
by Poole and Rosenthal. NOMINATE scores measure a congressional member’s
ideological position throughout their career. For this paper, the first-dimension score is
used, which measures economic liberalism or conservatism. Ideology is scored as a
continuous variable so that -1 is the most liberal and 1 is the most conservative. All
members of the House in every congress are assigned a value between -1 and 1 based on
their voting record, with both parties skewing towards the center.
Foreign Policy legislation is measured using the coding system set up for the
PIPC Database to track the content of legislation brought to vote in the House of
Representatives. The foreign policy category includes immigration, foreign aid, arms
control, State Department funding, human rights, terrorism, etc. It is separate from bills
about defense or funding for other cabinet departments that could be related to foreign
policy. Using only the votes on foreign policy bills, I created a score using the
NOMINATE formula for each member of the House in each congress from 1981–2013.
The scores use the same measurement system as the traditional NOMINATE score so
that -1 equals the most liberal on foreign policy, 0 is the center, and 1 equals the most
conservative on foreign policy. In general, foreign policy favored by conservatives is
associated with hard power, high defense spending, and a “proactive” response to
terrorist threats. Foreign policy favored by liberals is associated with non-military
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solutions to foreign disputes, reduced defense spending, and greater willingness to end
military involvement overseas (Rubenzer, 2017).

Distance between DW-NOMINATE and FPN by Member-Congress
Table 1 summarizes both the FPN Score and the DW-NOMINATE Score at the
member-congress level. Table 1 also summarizes the first outcome variable used in the
regression analyses—the Distance between the DW-NOMINATE and the FPN Score,
which is as simple difference between these two scores per member per congress; it
captures the difference between members’ voting behavior on foreign policy issues and
their voting behavior in all issue areas. This provides an individual-level measure of
whether foreign policy is distinct from other issue areas.

Table 1

Descriptive Statistics at the Member Level

FP-NOMINATE (FPN) Score

N
6,955

Mean
0.00477

SD
0.504

Min
-0.999

Max
0.989

DW-NOMINATE Score

6,955

-0.0029

0.399

-0.766

0.913

Distance between DWNOMINATE and FPN

6,955

-0.00813

0.355

-1.544

1.657

FPN Democrats

3,734

-0.354

0.355

-0.999

0.885

FPN Republicans

3,221

0.421

0.282

-0.965

0.989

DW-NOMINATE Democrats

3,771

-0.343

0.158

-0.766

0.884

DW-NOMINATE
Republicans

3,260

0.391

0.158

-0.044

0.913
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The expectation is that when a foreign threat is present, members should be less
likely to take extreme positions, and instead will be more likely to cooperate with the
other side. Hypothesis 1 anticipates less cohesion and more bipartisanship in foreign
policy voting during the times of threat. During both threat periods (1981–1988 and
2001–2005), Republican presidents held office. Given that the US president has an
outsized role in directing foreign policy, I expect the Democratic party, the opposition to
the President, to exhibit lower cohesion, such that some members of the opposition will
join the President’s party to back his foreign policy when the national interests of the US
are perceived as being threatened by a rival or challenger. This is why I estimate the
regressions on the split sample by party to evaluate this dynamic.

Measures of Cohesion by Party-Congress
At the party-congress level, party cohesion is captured by four dependent
variables:
•

Democratic Cohesion on FP, measured as the standard deviation of the
FPN Score for Democrats.

•

Republican Cohesion on FP, measured as the standard deviation of the
FPN Score for Republicans.

•

Democratic Cohesion on All Issues, measured as the standard deviation of
the DW-NOMINATE Score for Democrats.

•

Republican Cohesion on All Issues, measured as the standard deviation of
the DW-NOMINATE Score for Republicans.
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The standard deviation reflects variation within each party in each congress. For
instance, Democratic Cohesion on FP captures the extent to which the Democratic party
stuck together on foreign policy legislation for the given congress, because standard
deviation measures the degree to which Democratic party members differ from the
average Democrat in a given congress. The same is true for Republican Cohesion on FP.
Similarly, Democratic/Republican Cohesion on All Issues reflects the amount of
coordination on votes within the Democratic/Republican party respectively on all
legislation for the given time period.

Measures of Polarization by Congress
Additionally, to understand the degree of polarization, I use:
•

Average Democratic FPN Score, measured as the mean for Democrats in a
given congress.

•

Average Republican FPN Score, measured as the mean for Republicans in
a given congress.

•

Polarization on FP, measured as the difference-in-means between these
two FPN scores of the two parties per congress.

•

Average Democratic DW-NOMINATE Score, measured as the mean for
Democrats in a given congress.

•

Average Republican DW-NOMINATE Score, measured as the mean for
Republicans in a given congress.

•

Polarization on All Issues, measured as the difference-in-means between
these two FPN scores of the two parties per congress.
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Using the difference-in-means of FPN Scores for Democrats and Republicans by
congress provides reflects polarization because it demonstrates the distance between
Democrats and Republicans on foreign policy bills during a given congress. Similarly,
the difference-in-means of NOMINATE for Democrats and Republicans by congress
demonstrates the distance between Democrats and Republicans on all legislation during
that congress.
It is expected that Polarization on All Issues (the inter-party gap between the
NOMINATE scores) grows faster during the times of threat than Polarization on FP (the
gap between FPN scores).
Table 2 summarizes all congress-level outcomes.

Table 2
Descriptive Statistics at the Congress Level

Foreign Policy Score

Mean
0.025

SD
0.429

Min
-0.567

Max
0.714

N
32

Average Democratic FPN Score

-0.316

0.231

-0.567

0.355

16

Average Republican FPN Score

0.366

0.280

-0.479

0.714

16

Democratic Cohesion on FP

0.304

0.106

0.132

0.490

16

Republican Cohesion on FP

0.214

0.112

0.066

0.497

16

Polarization on FP

-0.647

0.534

-1.162

1.077

16

NOMINATE Score

0.020

0.374

-0.395

0.469

32

Average Democratic DWNOMINATE Score

-0.346

0.034

-0.395

-0.299

16
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Average Republican DWNOMINATE Score

0.386

0.050

0.306

0.469

16

NOMINATE SD

0.151

0.015

0.123

0.194

32

Polarization on All Issues

-0.833

0.064

-0.945

-0.758

16

Democratic Cohesion on All Issues

0.152

0.021

0.123

0.195

16

Republican Cohesion on All Issues

0.151

0.007

0.143

0.167

16

Independent variable External Threat
This project hypothesizes that the presence of a unifying threat will affect party
cohesion and bipartisanship over issues relating to foreign policy legislation. To use the
presence of a unifying threat as the independent variable the available data is divided into
two time periods where a threat was present: legislation passed during the perception of
the USSR as a rival and legislation passed in the years following September 11, 2001. It
also includes two periods where a threat was not present: the period of time between
1991 and 2001 and years after 2005. Using these two periods with no serious national
security risk allows us to compare levels of cohesion and bipartisanship between periods
of relative emergency and relative peace.
I use Gallup polls to determine when the public perceives a foreign threat from
either the USSR or Al-Qaeda. This results in a binary indicator of External Threat, that
takes on the value of 1 in years 1981-1988 (the Berlin Wall fell in 1989) and 2001-2004
and the value of 0 in years 1989-2001 and 2005-2013 (Richman, 1991; Gallup, 2020).
Accordingly, the congresses coded 1 are the 97th – 99th and the 107th – 109th congresses.
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The 100th and 108th congresses are coded 0.5 to represent a threat during only one year of
the congressional session.
For robustness, I also recode External Threat so that in one model, external threat
takes on the value of 1 in 2001–2002 only; another model includes external threat with a
value of 1 in 1981–1991 only. These results are included in the appendix.

Empirical Strategy
This paper’s approach is threefold. First, I use a t-test to determine whether the
means of FPN score and NOMINATE score are meaningfully different over time.
Second, to evaluate how foreign threats influence individual members’ tendency to widen
or shrink the gap between their voting behavior on foreign policy as opposed to all other
issues, I estimate a series of OLS regressions using different subsamples.
Next, I also use descriptive analyses to investigate the over time variation in these
scores. I employ time-series plots to visualize how party-level coherence has changed in
1981–2013. Finally, the time-series plots also visualize interparty polarization in 1981–
2013.
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ANALYSIS

Analysis at the Member-Congress Level
The primary contribution of this paper is the creation of Foreign Policy
NOMINATE scores, which allow us to see how members of the House behave on foreign
policy legislation relative to their general voting behavior. Using these scores and the
original NOMINATE scores, I test whether the presence of a threat increases party
cohesion and bipartisanship at the level of individual member. Taking the difference in
scores allows us to evaluate whether the presence of a (supposedly) unifying threat alters
voting behavior on foreign policy legislation in a different way than total voting behavior.
Hypothesis 1 anticipates more bipartisanship (i.e. less cohesion and less
polarization) on foreign policy issues under threat. During both threat periods (1981–
1988 and 2001–2005), Republican presidents held office. Given that the US president has
an outsized role in directing foreign policy, the Democratic party, the opposition to the
President, is expected to exhibit lower cohesion, such that some members of the
opposition will join the President’s party to back his foreign policy. This is why I
estimate OLS regressions on the split sample by party to evaluate this dynamic. Table 3
demonstrates the results of the OLS analysis at the member-congress level. The
dependent variable in all models is Distance between DW-NOMINATE and FPN.
I first use a t-test to determine whether the means of FPN score and NOMINATE
score for Democrats is meaningfully systematically different over time. In repeated
samples, the true difference-in-means falls within [-0.024, 0.0009] 95% of the time. The
test results in a p-value of 0.06853, which is not statistically significant at the 0.05 level. I
use the same test to determine whether the means of FPN score and NOMINATE score
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for Republicans are systematically different over time. In repeated samples, the true
difference-in-means falls within [0.0194, 0.0417] 95% of the time. The test results in a pvalue of 7.831e-0, which is statistically significant at the 0.05 level and is discernible
from 0. This result implies that Democrats’ overall voting in 1981–2013 did not
systematically differ on foreign policy issues from all other issues, while Republicans’
average voting on foreign policy was systematically more moderate (closer to 0) than on
all other issues.

Table 3
The Impact of External Threat on Distance between DW-NOMINATE and FPN

External Threat
Intercept
Congress FEs
N
Adjusted R2

(2)

(3)

Democrats

Republicans

-0.303***
(0.02)
0.171***
(0.02)
Yes

0.133***
(0.02)
-0.074***
(0.01)
Yes

3,734
3,221
0.2142
0.3838
Note: Numbers in cells are coefficient estimates, standard errors are in
parentheses. Models fit with OLS regression. Dependent variable is Distance
between DW-NOMINATE and FPN. * p < .05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Models 2 and 3 use the subsamples of only Democrats and only Republicans
respectively. The fit of Models 2 and 3 yield adjusted R2 indicators of 0.21 and 0.38
respectively. In Model 2, the presence of a unifying threat reduces the gap between the
two scores by 0.303 units for Democrats in the House, which is equivalent to explaining
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3.2% of the variation in the Democrats’ distance between the two scores. In Model 3, the
presence of a unifying threat also reduces the gap between the two scores by 0.133 units
for Republicans in the House, which is equivalent to explaining 1% of the Republicans’
variation in the distance between the two scores. This suggests that both parties moderate
their positions during a period of foreign threat.
Consider Table 4, in which I further split the sample by party (Models 4–5
include only Democrats vs. Models 6–7 include only Republicans) and by majority
control. In multiple congresses the House majority was controlled by the party in
opposition to the President: Democrats held majorities during the entire Reagan and G.
H.W. Bush presidencies and lost control under Clinton in the 1994 midterms, such that
Republicans held majorities in 104th–109th congresses in 1995–2007. Democrats then
controlled 110 and 111th congresses under G.W. Bush and Obama in 2007–2011. The last
112th congress of 2011–2013 included in the data set was controlled by Republicans
under President Obama.

Table 4
The Impact of External Threat on Distance between DW-NOMINATE and FPN,
Accounting for Majority Control
(4)

(5)
Democrats

External Threat
Intercept

(6)

(7)
Republicans

Dem House
Control

Rep House
Control

Dem House
Control

Rep House
Control

0.163***
(0.028)
-0.294***
(0.019)

-0.082***
(0.021)
0.198***
(0.014)

-0.254***
(0.028)
0.314***
(0.021)

0.112***
(0.017)
-.0116**
(0.012)
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Congress FEs
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
N
2,306
1,428
1,625
1,596
2
Adjusted R
0.3781
0.276
0.604
0.309
Note: Numbers in cells are coefficient estimates, standard errors are in
parentheses. Models fit with OLS regression. Dependent variable is Distance
between DW-NOMINATE and FPN. * p < .05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

A curious pattern emerges: when a party controls the majority in the House
(Models 4 and 7) the members’ distance between voting on foreign policy and all other
issues widens. In contrast, when a party is the minority in the House (Models 5 and 6),
the distance between the two scores shrinks. This implies that majorities—in the face of a
foreign threat—moderate their positions on foreign policy to a greater extent (less
alignment between FP and DW-NOMINATE scores) than minorities (a smaller distance
implies more alignment). This pattern is somewhat puzzling, since Democrats controlled
the majority facing a threat from the USSR in 1981–1988 under a Republican president,
but Republicans were in the majority in 2001–2005 under G.W. Bush, a Republican
president. Further qualitative examination is needed to substantiate this finding.
In particular, External Threat boosts the gap in the two scores for the majority
party members by 0.16 units for Democrats in Model 4 (explains 1.4% of variation in the
dependent variable) and by 0.11 units for Republicans in Model 7 (explains 2.5% of
variation in the outcome).
Minority party members (Models 5 and 6) tend to vote such that the distance
between the two scores shrinks; this effect is especially large for Republicans in Model 6.
External Threat reduces the gap in the two scores for the minority party members by 0.08
units for Democrats in Model 5 (explains 1% of variation in the outcome) and by 0.25
units for Republicans in Model 6 (explains 4.7% of variation in the outcome). The effect

31
in Model 6 is by far the largest substantive effect across all Models, implying that until
1988, Republicans tended to have a 4.7% narrower gap between their foreign policy
votes and all other issues than they did during under H.W. Bush presidency and in 2007–
2011 during the Obama presidency.

Analysis at the Party-Congress Level
Figures 1–4 chart the parties’ voting behavior in the House across congresses. In
all plots, red markers indicate Republicans, while Democrats are represented in blue.
Figures 1–2 visualize party-level average voting per congress based on the FPNOMINATE scores (Figure 1) and based on the DW-NOMINATE scores (Figure 2).

Figure 1
Foreign Policy Scores Across 97th – 112th Congresses
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Note: The blue markers indicate Democrats, the red markers indicate
Republicans. Average Democratic FPN Score is the mean for Democrats in a
given congress. Average Republican FPN Score is the mean for Republicans in a
given congress.

Two patterns emerge. First, Republicans tend to espouse more conservative
positions (more positive scores on the NOMINATE scale of -1 to 1) than Democrats in
foreign policy issues as well as all issue areas. Second, the FPN score is characterized by
greater variation from congress to congress than the DW-NOMINATE party-level score.
In particular, two congresses stand out: in the 99th congress (1985–1987), Democrats had
a higher average of 0.35 on foreign policy than Republicans (-0.47); in the 111th congress
(2009 –2011), the gap between the two parties was very narrow (-0.05 for Democrats vs.
0.14 for Republicans). This variation in the FPN scores (and the corresponding lack of
variation in the DW-NOMINATE scores, which appear as almost straight lines diverging
over time) indicates that foreign policy voting behavior can be modified by presence or
lack of a unifying foreign threat.
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Figure 2
Average Democratic and Republican DW-NOMINATE Scores in 97th–112th Congresses

Note: The blue markers indicate Democrats, the red markers indicate
Republicans. Average Democratic DW-NOMINATE Score is the mean for
Democrats in a given congress. Average Republican DW-NOMINATE Score is the
mean for Republicans in a given congress.
My argument implied that that the gap between parties’ DW-NOMINATE scores
would grow faster over time than in FPN scores, but that does not appear to be the case.
While party-level DW-NOMINATE scores diverge from each other over time, the FPN
scores do not exhibit any over time pattern.
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Figure 3
Democratic and Republican Cohesion on Foreign Policy in 97th–112th Congresses

Note: The blue markers indicate Democrats, the red markers indicate
Republicans. Democratic Cohesion on FP is the standard deviation of the FPN
Score for Democrats, while Republican Cohesion on FP is the standard deviation
of the FPN Score for Republicans.

Figures 3 and 4 show that the intraparty cohesion indicators, measured as standard
deviations for FPN scores in Figure 3 and as standard deviations for the DWNOMINATE scores in Figure 4. These figures indicate that, first, Democrats as a party
have substantially more variation in voting on foreign policy than Republicans, i.e.,
Democrats exhibit lower coherence as a party on foreign policy than Republicans do. In
all congresses (except the 111th congress of 2009 –2011), the standard deviation for
Democratic FPN score is on average 1.6 times larger than the standard deviation for
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Republican FPN score (the minimum is 0.97 times in the 111th congress and 3 times
larger in the 107th congress).
Second, both Democrats and Republicans are less cohesive on foreign policy
(Figure 3) than on all issues (Figure 4). Indeed, while the average the Democratic
Cohesion on FP is 0.3, the average the Democratic Cohesion on All Issues is 0.15. For
Republicans the difference is less pronounced: the average the Republican Cohesion on
FP is 0.21, the average the Republican Cohesion on All Issues is 0.15. For Democrats,
their cohesion on all issues has increased over time (the standard deviation has declined
during the 16 congresses under examination).
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Figure 4
Democratic and Republican Cohesion on All Issues in 97th–112th Congresses

Note: The blue markers indicate Democrats, the red markers indicate
Republicans. Democratic Cohesion on All Issues is the standard deviation of the
DW-NOMINATE Score for Democrats. Republican Cohesion on All Issues is the
standard deviation of the DW-NOMINATE Score for Republicans.

Consistent with my expectation, the parties exhibit less cohesion on foreign policy
(this is particularly characteristic of Democrats), than they do on all issues. In contrast to
my expectation, the presence of threat during in 1981–1988 and 2001–2005 does not
appear to influence the amount of party cohesion.

Analysis at the Congress Level
In Figure 5, Polarization on FP (shown in dark blue) is the differences between
Average Democratic FPN Score and Average Republican FPN Score per congress.
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Polarization on All Issues (shown in green) is the differences between Average
Democratic DW-NOMINATE Score and Average Republican DW-NOMINATE Score per
congress.
Figure 5
Polarization on Foreign Policy in 97th–112th Congresses

Note: The dark blue markers indicate polarization on all issues, the green markers
indicate polarization on FP. Polarization on FP is measured as the difference-inmeans between Average Democratic FPN Score and Average Republican FPN
Score per congress. Polarization on All Issues is measured as the difference-inmeans between Average Democratic DW-NOMINATE Score and Average
Republican DW-NOMINATE Score per congress.

Figure 5 complements Figures 1–2, as Figure 5 simply shows the differences-inmeans between the average FPN and average DW-NOMINATE by party by congress.
My expectation was that Polarization on FP would be lower (closer to 0) than
Polarization on All Issues. In particular, I expected that the movement towards 0 would
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occur during the times of foreign threat presence, i.e., during 97–100th congresses and
during 107–109th congresses. No such pattern is emerging.
In summary, I conclude that the data are largely inconsistent with my expectation
(although some of the anticipated patterns were borne out in the data) that foreign threats
substantially reduce intraparty cohesion and inter-party polarization.
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CONCLUSION

This paper asked: how does the presence of a unifying foreign threat affect party
cohesion and bipartisanship in the U.S. House? This is an important question, because
understanding congressional response to such events is crucial information in
understanding U.S. foreign policy and forecasting future responses to rising foreign
threats. My expectation was based on the reality that legislators are careful with their
votes because they don’t know which votes will become controversial in the next
election. In addition to fear of electoral punishment, opposition from a foreign threat
allows members of the House to prioritize their national identity over their party
membership. I expected to see a rise in bipartisanship, and therefore a decline in party
cohesion as party members abandoned party positions to compromise with the other
party, in years were a perceived foreign threat was present. The anticipated pattern that
US political parties facing foreign threats tend to reduce the distance between their voting
on foreign policy and on all other issues were borne out in the data, yet these results are
substantively modest. The descriptive analysis reveals that my expectations that foreign
threats substantially reduce intraparty cohesion and inter-party polarization largely
inconsistent with the data.
First, when a party controls the majority in the House and the external threat is
present, the majority members’ distance between voting on foreign policy and all other
issues widens. In contrast, when a party is the minority in the House, the distance
between the two scores shrinks in the face of an external threat. This implies that
majorities—when confronting a foreign threat—moderate their positions on foreign
policy to a greater extent (less alignment between FP and DW-NOMINATE scores) than
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minorities do (a smaller distance implies more alignment between FP and all other
issues). This pattern is somewhat puzzling, since Democrats controlled the majority
facing a threat from the USSR in 1981–1988 under a Republican president, but
Republicans were in the majority in 2001–2005 under G.W. Bush, a Republican
president. Further qualitative examination is needed to substantiate this finding.
Second, my argument implied that that the gap between parties’ DWNOMINATE scores would grow faster over time than in FPN scores, but the descriptive
analysis demonstrates that it does not appear to be the case. While party-level DWNOMINATE scores diverge from each other over time, the FPN scores do not exhibit
any over time pattern dependent on the presence of foreign threats. Furthermore, I
expected to observe reductions in polarization during the times of foreign threat presence,
i.e., during 97–100th congresses and during 107–109th congresses. No such pattern
emerges in the data.
Third, consistent with my expectation, the parties exhibit less cohesion on foreign
policy (this is particularly characteristic of Democrats), than they do on all issues. In
contrast to my expectation, the presence of threat during in 1981–1988 and 2001–2005
does not appear to influence the amount of party cohesion.
The robustness checks in the appendix include the independent variable foreign
threat recoded such that in one model, external threat takes on the value of 1 in 20012002 only; another model includes external threat with a value of 1 in 1981-1991 only.
There are several limitations of this work. One such limitation is the timeframe
covered in this analysis. Future work should expand to include a broader stretch of time
that includes different periods of both perceived threat and perceived safety. Looking

41
specifically at the Vietnam War would also provide interesting insight into how military
engagement affects congressional behavior in the context of a broader foreign threat such
as the Cold War. Additionally, future work should remove foreign policy votes from the
DW-nominate comparison score such that FPN score is the only measure of member
ideology on foreign policy. This would also provide an opportunity to conceptualize
foreign policy differently. The category could be expanding to include votes on defense
spending and other related issues or could be limited to a specific foreign policy issue
such as foreign aid.
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APPENDIX

Table AI Measuring Polarization through Difference-in-means
Polarization on FP Polarization on all issues
97th Congress

-0.799

-0.496

98th Congress

-0.809

-0.819

99th Congress

-0.837

-0.643

100th Congress

-0.822

-1.036

101st Congress

-0.762

-0.873

102nd Congress

-0.765

-0.875

103rd Congress

-0.758

-0.540

104th Congress

-0.797

-1.081

105th Congress

-0.801

-0.376

106th Congress

-0.810

-0.808

107th Congress

-0.928

-0.653

108th Congress

-0.931

-0.481

109th Congress

-0.945

-0.932

110th Congress

-0.933

-1.162

111th Congress

-0.807

-0.193

112th Congress

-0.845

-1.110
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Table AII: Standard Deviation Within Party Per Congress
Democrats

97th Congress
98th Congress
99th Congress
100th Congress
101st Congress
102nd Congress
103rd Congress
104th Congress
105th Congress
106th Congress
107th Congress
108th Congress
109th Congress
110th Congress
111th Congress
112th Congress

Republicans

FPN Score

NOMINATE
Score

FPN Score

NOMINATE
Score

0.412
0.490
0.361
0.307
0.231
0.270
0.345
0.319
0.389
0.253
0.281
0.132
0.251
0.188
0.483
0.151

0.195
0.181
0.167
0.165
0.166
0.166
0.162
0.152
0.138
0.139
0.135
0.133
0.124
0.135
0.145
0.123

0.257
0.328
0.274
0.254
0.230
0.234
0.189
0.159
0.331
0.175
0.093
0.066
0.094
0.109
0.497
0.136

0.167
0.157
0.148
0.155
0.161
0.156
0.144
0.155
0.145
0.147
0.147
0.143
0.144
0.146
0.148
0.147
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Table AIII: Robustness Checks
(1)
All obs.
External Threat
Intercept
Congress FEs
N
Adjusted R2

-0.082***
(0.02)
0.035*
(0.01)
Yes

(8)
USSR
97–112th Congresses
-0.083***
(0.02)
0.035*
(0.01)
Yes

(9)
9/11
-0.083***
(0.02)
0.035*
(0.01)
Yes

6,955
6,955
6,955
0.0214
0.0214
0.0214
Note: Numbers in cells are coefficient estimates, standard errors are in
parentheses. Models fit with OLS regression. Dependent variable is Distance
between DW-NOMINATE and FPN. * p < .05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Model 1 uses all individual-level observations. The presence of a unifying threat
reduces the gap between the two scores by 0.082 units for all members of the House. The
entire model has a poor fit; it explains 1.4% of variation in the distance between the two
scores. Although the impact of External Threat is statistically discernible, this effect is
substantively negligible, because it explains 0.2% of variation in the distance at the
individual level (partial eta2 = .0016). Models 8 and 9 use a recoded Independent
Variable. Model 8 uses external threat coded as 1 during 1981-1991 and 0 during all
other years. Model 9 uses external threat coded as 1 during 2001-2002 and 0 during all
other years.

